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INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPAL 
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983 
Michael J. Gerhardt* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Professor Christina Whitman of the University of Michigan 
Law School joined the chorus of law professors criticizing the 
Supreme Court's decisions in municipal liability cases under § 1983.1 
Her complaint differed, however, from all of the other criticisms. She 
argued that the problem in the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services2 and its progeny3 involving gov-
ernment responsibility for constitutional torts was that the Supreme 
Court had mistakenly applied the language of common law torts.4 She 
regarded this tendency as misguided because "tort language leads 
[Supreme Court justices] to look for individual choices and motives, 
for an actor or a 'mind' that can be evaluated. In most of these cases 
the possibility of looking at an institution as a unit distinct from the 
separate individuals who compose it is not considered."5 As an alter-
native, Professor Whitman proposed that in cases involving govern-
mental responsibility for constitutional torts the Court should: 
evaluate harms created by structures and contexts rather than by 
individuals .... [To date,] the Justices fail to see that injuries can be 
brought about quite inadvertently through the workings of institu-
tional structures-through the massing or fragmentation of author-
ity, or by the creation of a culture in which responses and a sense of 
responsibility are distorted.6 
In other words, governmental entities such as municipalities are or-
ganic, do not operate monolithically, and create or cause conse-
* Professor, The College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. B.A. Yale Uni-
versity; M.Sc. London School of Economics; J.D. University of Chicago. I am grateful to Alan 
Meese and to the participants in the DePaul Law Review's Symposium: Section 1983 Municipal 
Liability in Civil Rights Litigation, particularly Susan Bandes, Jack Beermann, Karen Blum, and 
Judge David Hamilton, for their helpful comments on the themes of this Article. 
1. Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 225 (1986). 
2. 436 u.s. 658 (1978). 
3. See infra notes 11, 28-30 and accompanying text. 
4. Whitman, supra note 1, at 234. 
5. !d. at 226. 
6. !d. 
669 
670 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:669 
quences as the result of deliberate misbehavior by certain officials as 
well as accidental or inevitable harm due to certain structural designs 
and dynamics. 
Since the publication of Professor Whitman's article over twelve 
years ago, institutional analysis has become increasingly popular in 
legal scholarship, particularly in the work of law and economics. 
While such analysis has permeated a good deal of administrative law 
and constitutional commentary (particularly with respect to congres-
sional operations), neither the Court nor legal scholars have employed 
it or investigated its utility in § 1983 litigation. Indeed, the Court for 
more than a decade has taken precisely the opposite direction-striv-
ing mightily to curb the possibility of holding cities liable on a respon-
deat superior basis rather than adopting or following the "structural 
analysis"7 Professor Whitman had found attractive in such earlier 
cases as Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.9 Of 
course, not long after the publication of her article, the Court over-
ruled Parratt in Daniels v. Williams. 10 In subsequent cases, including 
the Court's two 1997 decisions in this area,11 the Court has gone to 
great lengths to fit the individual tort model to its analysis in munici-
pal liability cases under § 1983. 
Part I of this Article attempts to assess the problems engendered by 
the Court's persistent embrace of the individual tort model in § 1983 
cases as the primary means of avoiding holding cities vicariously liable 
for their employees' mistakes or misconduct.12 Reevaluating the 
mode of analysis in municipal liability cases is opportune in light of 
the fact that three dissenting justices in the 1997 case of Board of 
County Commissioners v. Brown13-Justices Souter, Stevens, and 
Breyer-have taken the position that the time has come to reconsider 
Monell. 14 It is not clear whether the dissenters in Brown intend to 
substitute institutional analysis for the approach undertaken in Monell 
and its progeny. Nevertheless, it is clear that the balance at the heart 
of Monell-between protecting the basic autonomy and financial in-
tegrity of city governments and vindicating the federal rights of citi-
zens injured in some fashion by some official municipal action-has 
7. /d. at 269-70. 
8. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
9. 455 u.s. 422 (1982). 
10. 474 u.s. 327, 330-31 (1986). 
11. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe 
County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997). 
12. See infra Part I. 
13. 520 u.s. 397 (1997). 
14. /d. at 430. 
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become overly skewed in favor of the former concern. The original 
balance between competing concerns at the heart of Monell has 
largely been lost, and it has been lost largely because of the deficient 
means of analysis employed by the Supreme Court in § 1983 cases 
involving questions about municipal liability for constitutional torts. 
Also lost in this balance has been any pretense by the Supreme Court 
(or at least a working majority of its justices) to interpret § 1983 pur-
suant to its basic language and purpose. 
Part II examines an alternative mode of analysis for deciding ques-
tions about government responsibility for constitutional torts under 
§ 1983-namely, institutional competence.15 The latter approach has 
at least two advantages over the traditional mode of analysis em-
ployed in municipal liability cases: institutional analysis is consistent 
with the legislative history and text of § 1983, and it posits clear stan-
dards for determining municipal responsibility under § 1983 that 
would constrain judicial discretion while providing clear notice to lo-
cal and state officials of the kinds of actions for which municipal liabil-
ity under § 1983 ensues. 
The major problem engendered by the use of institutional analysis 
in § 1983 cases has to do with whether it is consistent with the plain 
language of § 1983, which imposes municipal liability against any 
"person" acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage" that causes the deprivation of federal rights.16 This 
problem is largely illusory, because a major point of institutional anal-
ysis is to clarify for judges and local and state officials the practices or 
circumstances that constitute the kinds of governmental actions for 
which municipal liability under § 1983 would result. 
Part III examines the kinds of questions raised by institutional anal-
ysis in § 1983 cases.17 Institutional analysis largely focuses on the 
likely consequences or outcomes of various external and internal ar-
rangements, including formal and informal modes of operations or un-
derstandings. Part III illustrates how this focus would produce 
different results in some of the major § 1983 cases litigated in recent 
years. 
I. 
I will forego repeating either the development of municipal liability 
jurisprudence under § 1983 or the pertinent legislative history of the 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1994). 
17. See infra Part III. 
672 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:669 
act, for I have previously set forth a view on the former18 and Profes-
sor Jack Beermann has provided an excellent survey of the latter.19 
Nor will I reiterate Professor Whitman's cogent analysis of the 
Supreme Court's commitment to the individual tort model in munici-
pal liability cases arising under § 1983. Instead, I will briefly clarify 
how institutional analysis fits within the Court's municipal liability 
jurisprudence. 
The obvious place to begin is Monroe v. Pape.20 Prior to Monroe, 
plaintiffs could succeed in § 1983 actions only by showing that an indi-
vidual was acting pursuant to a state policy or law. Since plaintiffs 
rarely, if ever, could make such a showing (since the governmental 
defendants argued that as long as no state law or local ordinance com-
manded the actions in question, those actions were ultra vires and thus 
not sanctioned nor approved in any way by state or local authority), 
§ 1983 had become virtually dormant. Monroe revitalized § 1983, for 
it held that any "person" who violates the Constitution while acting in 
his or her official capacity is liable under § 1983.21 That is, the fact 
that someone was acting in an official capacity ipso facto established 
that he or she was acting "under color of state law" at the time of the 
constitutional violation. 
If the Court had found further that a municipality is a "person" for 
purposes of § 1983, it would have meant that a city is always liable 
whenever one of its agents is liable, because agent liability depends 
upon the fact that the agent is acting in an official capacity. But the 
Court found otherwise.22 It read the legislative history of § 1983 as 
precluding such a finding. 23 The Court concluded that the term "per-
son" was not meant to include municipalities, even though the Court 
had noted that § 1983 had been enacted against the backdrop of the 
common law of torts in 1871 and that the latter common law allowed 
corporations generally to be held liable on the basis of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.24 
After Monroe, the Court repeatedly rejected making cities liable on 
the basis of respondeat superior for the civil rights violations of their 
employees. Instead, the Court insisted that municipal liability, if it 
18. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Munici-
pal Liability Under§ /983, 62 S. CAL. L. Rev. 539 (1989). 
19. Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DePAUL L. Rev. 
627 (1999). 
20. 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
21. !d. at 183-87. 
22. !d. at 191. 
23. /d. at 188-91. 
24. See id. at 190. 
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were to be possible at all under § 1983, had to be based on some evi-
dence or demonstration of intent on the part of the city to violate the 
Constitution. The search for intent became the main path by which 
the Court tried to allow for the vindication of federal rights under 
§ 1983 while avoiding making cities liable on the basis of respondeat 
supenor. 
For example, in 1978, the Court in Monell had three choices: (1) 
reaffirm Monroe completely; (2) make municipalities vicariously liable 
for the actions of their employees-an outcome that would have par-
alleled corporate liability in common law torts; or (3) adopt an inter-
mediate solution. The Court chose the third option. In particular, the 
majority struck a balance between making municipalities accountable 
in federal court for their constitutional violations and accommodating 
federalism concerns, including respect for the autonomy and financial 
integrity of states and local governments.25 The Court adopted an ex-
tremely formal analysis to reject the possibility of vicarious liability. 
Its formalistic analysis was designed to link municipalities to alleged 
constitutional injuries in a way that parallels the link between the act 
of an individual defendant and a plaintiff's injury in tort. As Professor 
Whitman has explained: 
[T]he Court seemed to be looking for something parallel to an indi-
vidual's decision to act, some indication of will or intent. . . . 
[F]ormal policies are not in any real sense analogous to individual 
decisions to act; they are more closely analogous to formal state-
ments or descriptions by individuals of intent to act. The obvious 
problem with limiting liability to situations in which the actor ex-
presses his or her or its intent to act is that liability can often be 
avoided by ... keeping silent. That, presumably, is why the Court 
included liability based on "official custom" as well as "official 
policy. "26 
But, the Court stressed, the "custom" must be "so permanent and well 
settled as to [have] the force of law. "27 In other words, "custom" 
serves as a substitute for (otherwise) unexpressed intent. 
After Monell, the Court's search for some demonstration of a mu-
nicipality's intent has coincided with its persistent rejection of respon-
deat superior in § 1983 cases. The Court has looked for some written 
or other official expression of the requisite malicious intent. Hence, 
the problem after Monell has been that the search for a mind has 
made little sense in suits against governments, for it has sought the 
25. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978). 
26. Whitman, supra note 1, at 238. 
27. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 
(1970)). 
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particular element that exists in individuals but not in institutions-a 
state of mind. Asking about negligence or deliberate indifference, at 
least as a reflection of attitude or motive, has been a misguided in-
quiry, for institutional defendants lack the characteristics of individual 
humans. The cast of mind, implicit in many formulations of the negli-
gence requirement, is inappropriate when the defendant is not an indi-
vidual, but rather an institution or its representative. There is no 
single human mind. 
After Monell, the Court has assumed without discussion that gov-
ernment acts as government only when it has played the role of deci-
sionmaker or legislature. Hence, the inquiry has taken the form of a 
search for the particular persons or particular legislative bodies that 
make government decisions. Much of the post-Monel! litigation has 
revolved around the question of whether a particular official has had 
sufficient status and authority to act as a decisionmaker for a munici-
pality. All three of the Court's major decisions in the 1980s on munic-
ipal liability under § 1983 reflect this focus: Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati;28 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik;29 and City of Canton v. 
Harris. 30 
Subsequent to these three cases, the Court has been increasingly 
hostile to employing respondeat superior in § 1983 cases. The domi-
nant trend has been to insist that a plaintiff suing a municipality under 
§ 1983 must show something more than that an individual acted in his 
or her official capacity. For example, in Board of County Commis-
sioners v. Brown,31 the question was whether a county could be held 
liable under § 1983 based on the county sheriff's decision to hire a 
deputy without adequate review of his background.32 The deputy in 
question turned out to be the son of the sheriff's nephew, who was 
allegedly prone to violence.33 A divided Court ruled that "it is not 
enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly at-
tributable to the municipality."34 Instead, the plaintiff also must prove 
that, through "its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the 'moving 
force' behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the 
municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability 
and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal ac-
28. 475 U.S. 469 (1986). 
29. 485 u.s. 112 (1988). 
30. 489 u.s. 378 (1989). 
31. 520 u.s. 397 (1997). 
32. /d. at 402. 
33. /d. at 401. 
34. /d. at 404. 
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tion and the deprivation of federal rights."35 The Court explained 
that: 
[As] in any § 1983 suit, ... the plaintiff must establish the state of 
mind required to prove the underlying violation. Accordingly, 
proof that a municipality's legislative body or authorized deci-
sionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally pro-
tected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted 
culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed 
by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates 
federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the 
moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff 
complain[ed].36 
In so ruling, the Court explained that in order "[t)o prevent municipal 
liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into respondeat superior 
liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker's 
inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged."37 The Court's 
declaration appeared to reintroduce the requirement of culpability on 
the part of a governmental defendant that its earlier decision in Owen 
v. City of Independence38 had found unnecessary.39 The Court con-
cluded that the requisite "deliberate indifference" had not been 
shown.40 
Perhaps the most significant sign of the extent of the Court's search 
for a municipal state of mind (and thereby to avoid holding cities lia-
ble on the basis of, or similar to, respondeat superior) is reflected in 
the Brown Court's rejection of any pretense that its analysis was 
grounded in the text or actual legislative history of § 1983.41 The 
Court declared that in enacting § 1983 "Congress did not intend mu-
nicipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the 
municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights."42 The 
Court had never before suggested that its search for a culpable mind 
in § 1983 cases was legitimized by the legislative history of the statute. 
As Professor Beermann has shown, the legislative history simply pro-
vides no basis for this assertion.43 
35. /d. 
36. /d. at 405. 
37. Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. 
38. 445 u.s. 622 (1980). 
39. /d. at 657. 
40. Brown, 520 U.S. at 415. 
41. /d. at 403. 
42. /d. at 415. 
43. Beermann, supra note 19, at 665. 
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Three of the four dissenters in Brown (excluding Justice Souter) ar-
gued that the time had come to reconsider Monel/.44 Justice Breyer 
explained that all the prerequisites for reexamination were present: 
the "doubtful[ness]" of "the original principle," the "complex" body 
of interpretive law that the principle had generated, developments 
that had divorced the Monell rule from its "apparent original pur-
poses," and the lack of significant reliance on the rule itself.45 
In the Court's other major recent decision on municipal liability, its 
aversion to using the doctrine of respondeat superior and thus its 
search for a mind to attribute to the institutional defendant was quite 
evident. In McMillian v. Monroe County,46 the question was whether 
a county could be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of a county 
sheriff who allegedly had suppressed exculpatory evidence in a crimi-
nal case.47 The answer depended on whether the county sheriff was a 
state or local official for purposes of § 1983.48 State law is significant 
in determining not only who is a policymaking official (as in Prapro-
tnik49) but also which entity that official represents when exercising a 
policymaking function.so The Court held that under Alabama law, 
county sheriffs acting in their law enforcement capacity represent the 
state and not their counties.51 Thus, there could be no local municipal 
liability.52 The four dissenters argued that the county sheriff had been 
acting for the county under Alabama law.53 
The majority undertook a heavily formalistic analysis, emphasizing 
that under Alabama state law, county sheriffs under certain circum-
stances "represent" the state and thus should have been treated as 
state officers for § 1983 purposes.54 In contrast, the dissenters took a 
more pragmatic approach, looking past formal labels to examine in-
stead such things as who elected the sheriff (the voters of the county), 
who paid his salary (the taxpayers of the county), and the scope of his 
jurisdiction (the county).55 As the next section suggests, the dissent's 
approach opens the door to, if not embraces, institutional analysis. 
44. Brown, 520 U.S. at 430·31. 
45. /d. at 431 (Breyer, 1., dissenting). 
46. 520 u.s. 781 (1997). 
47. /d. at 783-84. 
48. /d. at 783. 
49. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988). 
50. McMillan, 520 U.S. at 786. 
51. /d. at 793. 
52. /d. at 783. 
53. /d. at 797 (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting). 
54. /d. at 787. 
55. /d. at 799-800 (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting). 
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II. 
I have previously suggested that the Court's "policy" or "custom" 
prerequisite for municipal liability set forth in Monell has been based 
primarily on its balancing of competing constitutional concerns impli-
cated by the statute rather than just the plain language of the text and 
close reading of the statute's legislative history.56 As Professor Beer-
mann has shown, this balance has been increasingly skewed over the 
past decade or so in favor of one set of concerns-those relating to 
the preservation or protection of municipal (and state) autonomy and 
finances-at the expense of the other set of relevant concerns-vindi-
cating various federal rights. 57 The loss of this balance-as well as the 
pretense to justify the loss on the basis of the text and legislative his-
tory of § 1983-has coincided with the Court's increasingly intense 
search for finding a basis to hold cities liable under § 1983 without 
employing the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
One significant alternative for analyzing municipal liability under 
§ 1983 does have the potential for restoring some of the lost balance 
in the Court's decisions in this area as well as appropriate fidelity to its 
legislative history. This alternative view is the so-called "new institu-
tionalism."58 Focusing on the peculiar problems posed for legal analy-
sis by the nature of the institutions whose actions or decisions are 
being examined is, of course, not new. For instance, the legal process 
school, which became popular in the 1950s, examined the different 
fora or processes in which legal decisions or judgments for the pur-
pose of making sense of the latter in light of the peculiar aspects or 
institutional biases or practices of the former.59 Legal scholars have 
developed increasingly sophisticated ways of evaluating how various 
institutions with the authority to make legal decisions make those de-
cisions and exercise authority.6° 
The point of institutional analysis is that institutions take on a spe-
cial life of their own and that the attributes or qualities that distin-
56. Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 541-43. 
57. Beermann, supra note 19, at 653-54. 
58. For two excellent overviews of the "new institutionalism," particularly as it relates to ad-
ministrative and constitutional law, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFEGr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOS· 
ING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, EcoNOMics, AND PuBLIC PoLicY (1994); Edward L. Rubin, 
Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 463 (1995) (reviewing 
KOMESAR, supra). 
59. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SAcKs, THE LEGAL PROCEss: BAsic PROBLEMs 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey eds., 
1994). 
60. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26 (1994). 
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guish institutional arrangements need to be understood in order to 
appreciate the processes and quality of institutional decisionmaking. 
Institutions are subject to various external pressures, which affect in-
ternal operations and perspectives. Moreover, external pressures and 
internal arrangements pose various consequences for institutional per-
formance. Internal pressures, for instance, influence the perceptions 
of insiders of internal and external events. In addition, institutions 
differ in their structures, formal and informal internal arrangements, 
allocations of decisionmaking authority, and measures of perform-
ance. These differences pose various problems and consequences for 
defining the operations or dynamics of decisionmaking within differ-
ent institutions. 
The most serious advantage of institutional analysis is that it in-
creases our understanding of the degree to which institutional ar-
rangements influence outcomes. In recent years, the new 
institutionalists have primarily examined certain institutional arrange-
ments in the public and private sectors for the purpose of determining 
the utility of certain regulatory activities. The new institutionalists 
have not yet turned their attention, at least systematically, to the 
realm of § 1983 litigation or legislation. Such an effort would provide 
not only a fuller examination of the utility of institutional analysis but 
also a more sophisticated understanding of municipal liability under 
§ 1983. 
One of the first steps required in institutional analysis is to define 
the institutions within the scope of one's study. Municipal liability 
under§ 1983 implicates the involvement of at least two different kinds 
of institutions. The first is the political process. In any given case rais-
ing issues about municipal liability under § 1983, several different 
political processes are involved-federal (principally Congress), state 
(including state legislatures, agencies, executives, courts, and political 
subdivisions), and local (including cities and counties). The relative 
effectiveness of institutions in solving social problems is based on the 
differential levels of participation that they allow and the imperfec-
tions in participatory processes that are inherent in their organiza-
tion.61 Moreover, political processes-local, state, and federal-are 
vulnerable or subject to special interest groups who can monitor or 
discipline their membership to avoid free rider problems and thereby 
extract rents from groups that are too large and diffuse to mobilize 
their members.62 These large groups are sometimes mobilized by 
61. KoMESAR, supra note 58, at 10-11, 53-58, 65-75, 100-12, 128-38. 
62. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSoN, JR., THE Lomc OF CoLLECfiVE AcriON: PuBLIC Gooos AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132-33 (1965). 
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political entrepreneurs and are able to extract rents from, or even op-
press, minorities. These large groups also require considerable effort 
and means to organize on behalf of a common cause, and the difficulty 
of arranging such massive mobilization is an impediment to change. 
In contrast, smaller groups are easier to mobilize and, with substantial 
funding, can often capture the political process by virtue of their rela-
tive ease in organizing their membership and resources. 
Public choice theory is one form of institutional analysis that is 
helpful for clarifying the operations of collegial or legislative bodies, 
such as Congress or state assemblies.63 Public choice theory suggests 
that when institutions make decisions by a majority vote, the majority 
will generate logically inconsistent results unless the voters have very 
similar preferences.64 In other words, it is a mistake to think of the 
collective action of a collegial body as reflecting a single mindset. In-
stead, such action reflects an amalgamation of individual choices. 
Moreover, public choice theory suggests that the most effective means 
by which to change the orderings of preferences of the individuals par-
ticipating in a group decisionmaking process is through structural al-
terations to the system.65 For instance, the Senate has tried to check 
the growth of presidential appointment authority by the efforts of 
many senators to dictate to the President whom he should appoint to 
offices in their respective states and by delegating often decisive au-
thority (such as agenda setting) to smaller units such as committees or 
their chairs, which are potentially subject to domination by a single 
person or faction. 
For purposes of understanding municipal liability under § 1983, the 
nature of the political process is relevant in at least two significant 
ways. First, it is important for explaining why § 1983 has not been 
modified nor changed in any momentous way in spite of the potential 
liability municipalities have faced after Monell. At the congressional 
level, one would have thought that change or reform, even radical re-
form, was possible, particularly after the Republicans took control of 
Congress in 1994. One would have thought, for instance, that, given 
the commitment of many Republicans to protecting various federal-
ism values (such as curbing federal overreaching and preserving as 
much state and municipal autonomy as possible), the Republican 
leadership in Congress would have been inclined to review if not to 
amend § 1983 for the sake of protecting any threatened federalism 
63. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 55 (1991). 
64. /d. 
65. /d. 
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interests of concern to them. In order to make such changes, Republi-
cans (or any other interested parties, for that matter) require organi-
zation, means, and incentives for mobilization in favor of change. The 
absence of any such effort reflects not only the difficulties of organiza-
tion but also the apparent absence of the means, pressures, or incen-
tives for a critical mass of members of Congress to amend § 1983. In 
addition, many members of Congress might not perceive that munici-
pal liability jurisprudence under § 1983 poses much of a threat to the 
federalism values of greatest concern to them. They might perceive, 
for instance, that § 1983 has largely become the province of the fed-
eral judiciary rather than the federal legislature, that the federal judi-
ciary has dealt adequately with the issues involved, and that Congress 
is better off deferring to the courts in order to allow its members more 
opportunity to deal with more pressing issues. Any congressional def-
erence to the federal judiciary might also be based on perceptions of 
or belief in federal judges' greater expertise and greater insulation 
from volatile public reaction to handle the many controversial civil 
rights issues that routinely arise in § 1983 litigation. 
Moreover, none of the groups one would expect to have an interest 
in amending § 1983 have moved to amend nor succeeded in reforming 
§ 1983. Indeed, given that it might require fewer resources or person-
nel to influence one body-Congress-than fifty state legislatures, 
one might expect Washington-based interest groups or lobbyists to 
have an advantage in addressing the concerns of their memberships 
about § 1983. For instance, civil rights groups, which generally have 
relative ease in mobilizing because of their size and the intense com-
mitment of their membership to the pursuit of certain values, might 
have an interest in revising § 1983 to allow for greater latitude in suing 
local governments for civil rights violations. Yet, civil rights groups 
probably have less influence than state and local governments (and 
their leaders and constituencies) with a Republican Congress than 
civil rights groups would have with a Democratically controlled one. 
Meanwhile, state and local governments might not feel intensively the 
need to lobby Congress for changing § 1983, because of the possibility 
of adverse publicity and because the doctrine is relatively congenial to 
them (for it has become increasingly hard to sue cities for civil rights 
violations over the past decade). The failure to influence Congress is 
a function to some extent of states, cities, and other interested parties 
not having had such sufficient incentive for pressuring Congress to 
amend § 1983. 
The other major institution involved in municipal liability cases 
under § 1983 is, of course, the federal judiciary. Generally, federal 
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courts are designed to be protected from external political forces, but 
this insularity generates high litigation costs and consequently pro-
vides restricted access for many individuals and interests. The federal 
courts generally are most effective when low stakes interests are trans-
formed into high stakes interests by the occurrence of a particular 
event, such as an injury. Once the parties arrive in court, limitations 
on the judiciary's competence and scale produce additional imperfec-
tions or risks in the process. For instance, judicial concerns about the 
sizes of caseloads are quite reasonable, given the relatively small 
number of federal judges in comparison to the sources of disputes in 
society. 
Nevertheless, the federal judiciary has largely dictated the fate of 
municipal liability under § 1983 for several reasons. First, federal 
judges have developed much greater expertise in dealing with § 1983 
issues because the issues arise so frequently. Second, federal judges 
pose a much smaller, less dispersed, more accessible target for some 
groups to try to influence than many other governmental institutions 
(such as state governments or Congress). Relatively well financed or 
organized groups or parties can focus their energies on a single judge 
or small set of judges in order to obtain certain results. Once a court 
decides a case, the decision often retains influence, not just with that 
court, but also oftentimes with other courts. The higher the court in 
an appellate system, the greater the influence it has over other courts. 
Third, litigation in federal court offers a significant potential for sub-
stantial rewards. Hence, the desire for vindicating federal rights and 
collecting substantial damages are huge incentives for bringing such 
litigation. No doubt, the tendency of federal judges to protect federal-
ism concerns or to be sympathetic to the vindication of federal rights 
will prove to be more attractive to one side than another in a munici-
pal liability case (depending of course on the judge's particular lean-
ings). Fourth, the federal judiciary has not lobbied for reform of 
§ 1983 as it did with respect to habeas. This failure might reflect many 
things, including an absence of a widespread feeling in the judiciary 
that change is necessary, that the costs and burdens of mobilization 
outweigh any likely benefits to be achieved from mobilization, or that 
federal judges are reluctant to relinquish any of their authority over 
the area to Congress. 
After defining the relevant institutions involved in municipal liabil-
ity cases, one should next consider the extent to which clarifying the 
nature of these institutions would help to clarify the municipal liability 
doctrine or effectuate the purposes of § 1983. As long as municipali-
ties qualify as "persons" for purposes of § 1983 litigation, the real is-
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sues have to do with causation and culpability. These real issues are 
how do institutions cause injuries and how should culpability be deter-
mined for the injuries caused. The individual tort model sheds no 
light on how institutions cause harm. Institutional analysis does, how-
ever, help to illuminate the relationships among institutional struc-
tures, arrangements, practices, and outcomes (including injuries). 
These relationships illuminate the extent to which references to culpa-
bility makes sense with an institutional defendant (for instance, the 
identification of an internal arrangement that is likely to cause or that 
has caused harm is relevant for establishing causation, while the as-
sessment of how long this set of circumstances has existed as well as 
the number of times it has actually resulted in constitutional violations 
is pertinent to an inquiry about culpability). 
The application of institutional analysis to municipal liability ques-
tions under§ 1983 also raises some serious questions about the impact 
of such analysis on municipal decisionmaking structure. Some think 
that it would have little effect, particularly if the costs for change ex-
ceed the costs of litigation. Others think that the prospect, if not the 
fact, of such liability would impose considerable pressure on munici-
palities to improve their training (or evaluation) of their employees 
and otherwise to evaluate their organizations or structures in order to 
adopt the most cost effective means for providing services with the 
least amount of potential for significant liability costs. 
The closest analogy for determining the potential impact of institu-
tional analysis on municipal decisionmaking or structure is the influ-
ence of judicial development and enforcement of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior on private corporations.66 First, respondeat supe-
rior developed as a means for providing substantial notice to employ-
ers and employees (as well as consumers) of the kinds of problems for 
which the employers may be held liable. Second, the doctrine has 
provided a test that judges can easily understand and administer and 
that otherwise constrains their discretion. Third, the doctrine devel-
oped in cases involving private defendants in part because those de-
66. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. 
L. REv. 1477 (1996). One of the major problems with making cities liable for any wrongdoing by 
their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior is that it is conceivably inconsistent 
with the plain language of§ 1983. Section 1983 makes liable any "person, acting under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" that causes the deprivation of federal 
rights. Respondeat superior focuses on whether someone who works for a city has made a mis-
take or done something that has hurt someone else but not on whether the person has been 
acting pursuant to or under the apparent authorization of a "statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage." Institutional analysis avoids this problem, because it places any deprivation of 
federal rights within an institutional context, which necessarily reflects or exists as the conse-
quence of a"statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." 
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fendants had to take claims seriously or otherwise risk bankruptcy if 
they failed to do so. Because bankruptcy is usually not a realistic pos-
sibility for cities, they might not respond to nor deal with the prospect 
of the applicability of respondeat superior in the same manner as pri-
vate businesses or employers have done. Indeed, the prospect of pos-
sible bankruptcy might lead municipalities to invest in insurance or 
indemnification that would protect them from insolvency. Such pro-
tection might lead municipalities to spend fewer resources on training 
or avoiding constitutional violations because it is no longer in their 
economic interests to do so. 
Nevertheless, institutional analysis suggests the limitations of this 
analysis for two reasons. First, it is possible for civil rights groups or 
other interested parties to try to amend § 1983 to counteract whatever 
disincentives indemnification would pose for municipalities to take 
their constitutional obligations seriously (in spite of the expenses in-
volved for doing so). Of course, the absence of any real reform of 
§ 1983 suggests that considerable mobilization would have to occur 
and considerable pressure would have to be brought to bear in order 
to effectuate meaningful change. Second, if the financial costs of 
avoiding violations of constitutional rights were too high for some mu-
nicipalities to muster, the cities remain vulnerable to lawsuits precisely 
because of the obvious problems posed or caused by the inadequacies 
of their expenditures. Third, municipal governments tend to be cen-
tralized and consist of relatively few administrators, such that these 
governments are relatively prone to pressure from well organized and 
financed interest groups, such as civil rights organizations. The inter-
est groups no doubt could put a great deal of pressure on cities to 
adopt practices that would reduce or avoid practices that would in-
crease the odds of the occurrence of constitutional violations. 
III. 
Employing institutional analysis in § 1983 cases requires changing 
the language and modes of analysis employed in litigating municipal 
liability under § 1983. Judges and others have had a penchant-in-
deed, they have been trained-to use formalistic reasoning in han-
dling § 1983 municipal liability issues; such reasoning focuses 
primarily on the legal labels for and rigid technicalities of various 
power arrangements in a governmental context. Using the individual 
tort model to evaluate claims of municipal liability under § 1983 is 
further supported by the statute's provision of liability only for a "per-
son" (implying some individual) who has "caused" some harm. Insti-
tutions operate, however, between the generality of formal rules and 
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the realm of individual decisionmaking. Institutions provide the arena 
in which abstract commands of legal rules and the disparate goals of 
individuals intersect and are given meaning and expression. In the 
context of cases involving claims of municipal liability for constitu-
tional torts, focusing on institutional operations, arrangements, and 
dynamics would raise some significant questions, such as: (1) what are 
the external pressures on each of the major institutional actors in-
volved in municipal liability cases brought under § 1983; (2) what dif-
ferences do these external pressures make in the performances of 
these institutional actors; and (3) has any part of the internal opera-
tions been captured from interests or factions inside or outside of the 
organization? Other significant questions include (1) what are the in-
ternal organizational structures of each of the major institutions in-
volved in § 1983 cases, and (2) what differences do these internal 
arrangements make to the performances of those operating inside the 
institutions as well as the latters' perceptions of the external pressures 
on the institutions? 
Organizational theory provides different perspectives on the inter-
nal dynamics or organizations of institutions. These perspectives de-
rive, for example, from the human relations school, decision theory, 
and a broad range of approaches regarding organization as a bounded, 
interdependent, and generally self-regulating system.67 Building on 
the insights of these different organizational theories, one might con-
sider whether a municipality's structure encourages or discourages 
adherence to constitutional standards of behavior; whether a munici-
pality's internal arrangements conceal consequences or dilute respon-
sibility in a way conducive to unconstitutional behavior; and what the 
incentive systems created by the structure for those operating within 
the structure are. 
As one might expect, asking the questions posed by institutional 
analysis would almost certainly lead to different reasoning, if not dif-
ferent outcomes, in some of the major municipal liability cases liti-
gated under§ 1983. Three examples suffice for present purposes. For 
instance, in City of Canton v. Harris,68 the plaintiff sought municipal 
liability based on the municipality's allegedly inadequate training of 
its jail personnel to recognize the need for serious or moderately seri-
ous health care for prisoners in their charge.69 The pertinent ques-
tions under institutional analysis would have been: (1) how often 
health problems requiring specialized medical attention had arisen 
67. See Rubin, supra note 58, at 471-72. 
68. 489 u.s. 378 (1989). 
69. /d. at 380. 
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among jail inmates; (2) what kind of training (or resources) had been 
given to deal with such problems in the defendant municipality; (3) 
what kind of training had been devoted to such problems in other 
similarly sized cities; and (4) what consequences were likely to have 
occurred given the frequency of the problem and the training given or 
the resources spent. Comparative data might be especially relevant 
for determining the likelihood of certain consequences or outcomes 
given a municipality's internal arrangements. 
In a second example, Brown, the dissenters appear to have em-
ployed reasoning akin to institutional analysis. As I have previously 
indicated, the case dealt with the question of whether a county should 
have been held liable under § 1983 because of a county sheriff's fail-
ure to provide an extensive or thorough background check of a dep-
uty, which would have uncovered the latter's propensity for 
violence. 70 Institutional analysis would have focused, as Justice Souter 
in part did in dissent,71 on determining the usual procedures for hiring 
police personnel in the county, whether such procedures were fol-
lowed in Brown, and the likely consequences of deviating from those 
practices in Brown. 
Finally, it is also possible that institutional analysis would have 
posed some different consequences in McMillian. Institutional analy-
sis would have focused on the same kinds of issues examined by the 
dissent, which looked past the formalities of state law to determine 
the county sheriff's apparent authority.72 As Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded her dissent, "[a] sheriff locally elected, paid, and equipped, 
who autonomously sets and implements law enforcement policies op-
erative within the geographic confines of a county, is ordinarily just 
what he seems to be: a county official."73 
CoNCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's persistent search for an alternative to holding 
cities liable on a respondeat superior basis in § 1983 cases has had 
significant consequences on its resolution of questions about govern-
mental responsibility for constitutional torts. At the very least, the 
Court's aversion to respondeat superior has resulted in a substantial 
body of doctrine that has made it more difficult to hold municipalities 
accountable for any constitutional wrongs committed by its employ-
ees. The problem is that institutions can cause harm even in the ab-
70. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1997). 
71. !d. at 417-18 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
72. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 797 (1997). 
73. !d. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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sence of the malicious intent of some key employees. Institutions can 
cause harm as a consequence of the nature of their organizational 
structure, including formal lines of decisionmaking and informal ar-
rangements or understandings. Oftentimes in institutions the gaps left 
by formal rules or communications allow for the development of in-
formal practices that take on lives, significance, and perceived legiti-
macy of their own. 
The purpose of this Article has been to sketch the significance of 
the application of institutional analysis to claims of municipal liability 
under § 1983. Of course, whether such analysis will be adopted in 
such cases is uncertain at best. Ironically, whether institutional analy-
sis will become the appropriate mode for examining government re-
sponsibility for constitutional torts depends on the decisions or actions 
of several institutions other than municipalities. To begin with, the 
Supreme Court has yet to employ institutional analysis explicitly in 
any area of the law. Moreover, while at least three justices seem dis-
posed to overruling Monell, a majority still embrace the language and 
reasoning of Monell, including its "policy" or "custom" requirement 
for municipal liability. Nor is it certain by any means what, if any, 
alternative analysis a majority of the Court would adopt if it were dis-
posed finally to overrule Monell. In addition, Congress seems dis-
posed to leave the future of municipal litigation under § 1983 for the 
federal courts to decide. It is also far from certain that substituting 
something like institutional analysis for the individual tort model in 
municipal liability cases under § 1983 would be popular with either 
federal judges or practitioners who operate routinely in the field. 
Both judges and practitioners, no doubt, have incurred considerable 
expenses and resources to develop their respective expertise in deal-
ing with Monell and its progeny. Their disposition would likely be to 
resist rather than to accept change readily. As the development of the 
law on municipal liability under § 1983 demonstrates, change, particu-
larly when institutions are the subjects or instruments of change, is no 
simple matter. The complexity and difficulty of achieving such change 
tells a lot about the present state and likely future of municipal liabil-
ity jurisprudence. 
